Just had a great convo with Kempster from D_D who has played a core role in operational efforts for that DAO since its inception. He shared with me this great forum post that represents a turning point they had in Nov '22 after reaching a point where the initial governance + resource allocation structures they had set up had turned out to be unsustainable
Since that realization, they have made strides to get “everything onchain”, reduce DAO structure as much as possible, incentivize individual/group action to emerge from the DAO, and turn the communal layer into a solidarity network
These ideas are very similar to a lot of the thinking that has been going on in PA (as well as FWB in their recent town hall), and provides another data point that we are all thinking about things correctly (at least directionally)
I didn’t do too much of a deep dive into the different incentive mechanisms he was outlining, but I feel like the takeaway is that with a focus on everyone becoming a builder, there’s not enough ______ to go around.
We’re poised to have similar problems in the near future. Feel like this is where we lean into our, you have the agency to go out and seek funding arc, seek collaborations, seek partnerships.
How does the above, and the fact that we exist within the Nouns model change the way we should compare ourselves to other DAOs organizationally?
I’ve been thinking about this thread non-stop for the past couple of days. The sentiment is explained very well from this thread by Austin Robey and many communities seem to be heading into “How do we minimize poor financialized feedback loops while also developing more coherent membership logic, participation strategy?”
I’ve been particulary interested in the the Bundesliga 50+1 rule which states that:
in order to obtain a license to compete in the Bundesliga, a club must either wholly- or majority-own its association football team.
This rule was implemented 1998 to address the growing need for external financial investment, while also ensuring that the club’s members retain overall control, by owning 50% of shares +1 share, to protect themselves from the influence of external investors.
Here are two ideas I want explore more:
Public Assembly restructures the current Veto power, held by a 4/7 multisig operated by FF89DE(founding team), by extending the membership of the veto to other non-founding PA members on a fixed-term proposal basis. Effectively creating a “veto council”.
Public Assembly removes all of the current founder’s allocation (10% Zora, 4% FF89DE, 1% Builder DAO) and becomes the only entity that receives an founder’s allocation of 51%. This allows members of Public Assembly to submit proposals that effectively delegate/elect deserving builders, operators, and prominent figures to participate in the governance of Public Assembly representing a specific need and vision. I think this will push everything to be onchain as much as possible, and coordination, legitimacy can have a greater role in overseeing the leadership of the DAO.
I have some more thoughts on this, but they veer off to the roadmap and operational strategies. Hopefully we can discuss some of these ideas on the townhall!